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Abstract—With the emergence of wide bandwidth wireless 
networks, mobile Internet is set to provide a significant channel for 
multimedia content distribution. The need for mobile digital right 
management (DRM) solution is thus intensified in order to 
safeguard mobile media content. The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) 
has been set to define open DRM technologic specifications to 
protect copyrighted content against piracy, unauthorized use and 
distribution over mobile networks. However, we argue that there 
still are some potential security flaws in its recent version 2 
specifications. A secure DRM scheme based on Trusted Mobile 
Platform (TMP) is proposed in this paper to enhance the security of 
OMA DRM specification v2 and provide interoperability and 
compatibility between Trusted Computing (TC) and OMA DRM. 
According to our analysis thereafter the TMP in conjunction with 
OMA DRM v2 may offer a considerably more robust DRM system 
for future mobile networks. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile equipments (ME) with advanced multimedia and 
networking capabilities introduce new business opportunities by 
enabling provision of rich content such as games and 
multimedia for mobile users. However, content piracy is seen as 
a major obstacle when realizing these business prospects. The 
need for mobile digital right management (DRM) solution is 
thus intensified in order to provide a controlled consumption of 
digital content to protect the intellectual property rights of the 
authors and the content providers [1,2].  
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [3] formed in June 2002 
has been working on mobile DRM to introduce and promote 
open standards and specifications for the application and 
services over mobile networks. In September 2002, OMA 
approved version 1.0 for the DRM specification [4], which 
specifies three different methods that vary in complexity 
requirements and offer different levels of security for the 
distributed content. The recent version 2 specifications [5] 
issued in December 2004 are expected to provide mechanisms 
for secure authentication of trusted DRM Agents, and for secure 
packaging and transfer of usage rights and DRM Content to 
trusted DRM Agents.  
However, we argue that the OMA DRM system based on its 
v2 specifications has to face the following potential risks. At 
first, current mobile platforms including its software and 
hardware are untrusted. E.g. since current mobile operating 
systems, such as Palm OS and Symbian, still have a large 
number of open security gaps [6] and can not enforce mandatory 
access control policies [7], users who receive the legal content 
can become potential attackers by employing software that 
allows illegal forwarding of the copyrighted content after the 
received digital content is decrypted by DRM Agent. Meanwhile, 
since there is no process separation mechanism in current 
hardware and software of mobile platform, attacker and/or virus 
can access DRM Agent’s process easily to compromise some 
sensitive information such as Content Encryption Key (CEK) of 
the Digital Content Format (DCF) and DRM Agent’s private 
key etc, which may cause fragmentation of the OMA DRM 
system. Secondly, OMA DRM systems do not provide a way to 
protect a digital content from the Right Issuer (RI). If the owners 
of the Content Issuer (CI) and that of RI are not the same, the RI 
may become another potential attacker to distribution digital 
content with its received CEK from CI. Finally, current OMA 
DRM v2 specifications have provided mutual authentication 
mechanism between RI and DRM Agent. Nevertheless, the CI 
does not identify the consumer before they download the DCF. 
Since the content download will consume a large number of 
channel and bandwidth particularly for wireless networks, the 
uncontrolled download may result in possible Deny-of-Service 
(DoS) attack on CI and wireless network operator. 
The schemes that utilizes watermarking as complementary 
solution for DRM on ME is presented in [8, 9] to enhance the 
security of copyrighted media distribution. However, they just 
distinguish the un-copyright content from the genuine ones but 
can not prevent abusing of the content and can not solve the 
above presented security flaws in current OMA DRM systems 
either. The concept of DRM scenario based on Trusted 
Computing (TC) [10] for personal computer (PC) and wired 
networks is discussed in [11]. Meanwhile, enforcement of a 
mandatory access control policy, observance of the principle of 
least privilege and provision of trusted paths were identified in 
[11] as key requirements of DRM system, which are absent in 
mainstream PC operating system. However, it does not provide 
any detail scheme for establishing DRM system, particularly 
mobile DRM system, over TC architecture. Moreover, we still 
confuse about how to support interoperability and compatibility 
between TC and DRM.  
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mobile networks to overcome the above proposed security flaws 
in current OMA DRM v2 system. The interoperability and 
compatibility between TC architecture for ME and OMA DRM 
system is also discussed. According to our analysis thereafter the 
TC specifications for ME in conjunction with OMA DRM v2 
may offer a considerably more robust platform for mobile DRM.  
II.  COMBINATION OF TMP AND OMA DRM 
2.1  Trusted Mobile Platform (TMP) 
In October 2004, Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [10] 
develops Trusted Mobile Platform (TMP) specifications [12-14], 
which defines comprehensive end-to-end security architecture 
and focuses on mobile platform identity and integrity to prove 
TC for ME. The generic two processors hardware architecture 
for TMP is depicted in Fig.1. The components darkened make 
up the trust boundary including 1) the application processor 2) 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 3) USIM (Universal Subscriber 
Identification Model) 4) Core Root of Trust for Measurement 
(CRTM) 5) internal flash, 6) memory controllers and 7) DMA 
controller. Where CRTM is stored in the ROM memory and 
performs the initial trust measurements for the remainder of 
platform on power up. While, TPM [15] is a very important 
tamper-resistant component in TMP who is responsible for 
recording the integrity measurements of TMP and works closely 
with the CRTM to perform trusted boot. TPM also provides 
security functionality, such as platform attestation, protected 
storage, and sealing, to measure and validate the hardware 
and/or software configurations of the platform. For more detail 
about TMP architecture, refer to [12-15]. 
Some key features of TMP are listed as the follows, which are 
beneficial to satisfy critical requirements of DRM system. 
Firstly, integrity measurement can provide trusted boot of ME 
and detect virus or attacker’s malicious tamper on operating 
system and/or DRM Agent when ME powers up. Secondly, 
process separation and mandatory access control policies can 
resist unauthorized access on DRM Agent’s process. Thus the 
attacker can’t compromise sensitive information from the 
hardware resource used by DRM Agent. Thirdly, protected 
storage can be utilized to safeguard DRM Agent’s private key 
and CEK so that attacker can not read them from non-volatile 
memory. Finally, the seal storage and mandatory access control 
policy can also constrain user’s illegal distribution of protected 
content to other ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2  TMP-based DRM system for mobile networks 
As shown in Fig.2, TMP-based DRM scheme is proposed in 
compliance with OMA DRM specifications v2. In our scheme, 
just like OMA DRM specifications there still are four actors that 
interact with each other in order to provide access to protected 
digital content to the end-user. The CI, as the owner of digital 
content, firstly converts content to DCF and then negotiates 
Right Object (RO) with one or more RI, which describes 
permissions and constraints granted to the DRM Agent when 
accessing a specific DCF. Before selling a RO to the end-user, 
the RI sets up a trusted relationship with the DRM Agent, a 
trusted logical entity residing in the user’s ME. Trust in OMA 
DRM v2 is based on PKI certificates issued by a Trusted 
Authority. In OMA DRM the right and content are logically 
separate entities, although being uniquely associated. Thus 
consumer must gain DCF and corresponding RO from CI and RI 
respectively for usage of the protected content. For more detail 
refer to [3-5].  
The contribution and novelty of our scheme to the original 
OMA DRM are listed as the follows: 
(1)  DRM Agent is embedded in TMP. DRM Agent’s public-
key certificate, private key and original integrity metric are 
stored in TMP’s TPM, which can not be accessed by 
unauthorized user and/or process.  
(2)  TPM offers trusted boot for ME with CRTM and should 
check the integrity of DRM Agent before the download of 
protected content. 
(3)  Before sending the DCF to the consumer, CI should identify 
the consumer to resist DoS attack. 
(4)  DRM Agent should authenticate the consumer via TPM and 
USIM to against abuse on DRM Agent.  
(5)  Before responding the RO to DRM Agent, RI should check 
the validation of the state of TMP via TC’s remote 
attestation (including Integrity report protocol and 
Validation data protocol) to against malicious tamper on 
mobile platform by attacker and/or virus. 
(6)  The RO validation, interpretation and enforcement 
functions of a DRM Agent are implemented within the 
trusted boundary of TMP. Information inputted by 
user/consumer/subscriber and/or shown on screen is 
transferred via TMP’s trusted I/O. 
(7)  The CI does not deliver CEK to RI directly. Two secret key 
seeds (S1, S2) to generate CEK are issued by CI. Where S1 is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. TMP-based OMA DRM functional architecture  
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Figure 1. Generic hardware architecture for trusted mobile platform 
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within DCF. While S2 is firstly encrypted by RI’s public key and 
sent to RI. Then RI retrieves S2 and encrypts S2 with DRM 
Agent’s public key and delivers it to DRM Agent in RO. Thus 
neither the RI nor consumer can capture or construct the CEK 
individually in order to decrypt the corresponding DCF.  
As shown in table I our TMP-based DRM is compared with 
the original OMA DRM v2. All expected security feature in the 
left row will be achieved in our scheme which can improve the 
security and robust of DRM systems for mobile networks. 
TABLE I.   COMPARISON BETWEEN OMA DRM AND OUR TMP-DRM 
Expected security features  OMA 
DRM 
TMP-
DRM 
Integrity protection on DRM Agent and mobile platform  No  Yes 
Confidentiality of DRM Agent’s sensitive information  No  Yes 
Mutual authentication between user and ME  No  Yes 
Resist compromised ME’s attack or illeaglly distribution.  No  Yes 
Consumer identified by CI to resist DoS attack on CI  No  Yes 
Resist compromised/malicious RI’s attack or piracy  No  Yes 
2.3  Authentication in TMP-based DRM system 
As shown in Fig.3, according to the critical requirements of 
TMP and OMA DRM v2, in our scheme we argue that five 
kinds of possible authentication should be offered in sequence as 
the follows in order to provide a robust platform for mobile 
DRM systems. Where USIM is used to store 
user/owner/subscriber/consumer’s public-key certificates, 
private key and other sensitive information that can prove their 
identities, e.g. password and biometric template. 
(1)  Mutual authentication between user/owner and ME via 
USIM and TPM. The password associated with fingerprint 
is strongly recommended to attest user/owner’s identity. 
(2)  Mutual authentication between subscriber and network 
operator via USIM.   
(3)  DRM Agent identifies consumer via USMI and TPM. 
(4)  Content provider/CI authenticates consumer via USIM. 
(5)  Mutual authentication between DRM Agent and RI with the 
help of TPM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Compatibility and interoperability between TC and DRM 
Our scenario of solution to offer compatibility and 
interoperability between TCG and OMA DRM is depicted in 
Fig.4. Where Content Management License Administrator 
(CMLA) [16] is a licensing and compliance entity formed to 
provide a full solution implementation of the OMA DRM v2 
interoperability specification.  
On one hand, CLMA issues security certificates (SC) to RI, 
CI and DRM Agent to establish trust relationship. OMA offers 
technical specifications (TS) e.g., OMA DRM v2, to RI and CI 
as well as mobile platform manufacture. Mobile platform 
manufacture also conforms the TMP specifications provided by 
TCG to support TC in ME. On the other hand, CI, RI and mobile 
platform manufacture provide compliance assurance (CA) to 
TCG and CLMA separately. The compliance assurance provided 
by RI and CI to TCG is mainly shown in support on TMP’s 
remote attestation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  BASIC DOWNLOAD PULL MODEL  
As shown in Fig.5, we take basic download pull model, which is 
the mainstream method of content distribution in mobile DRM 
system, as a specific example to describer how trusted 
computing is combined with OMA DRM in our scheme. The 
first two authentication phases presented in subsection 2.3 will 
not be discussed again within this scope on the premise that 
subscriber has accessed the mobile network successfully. Here 
we only focus on depicting the difference between our download 
pull model and the original scheme. The detail information isn’t 
mentioned hereafter can be regarded in compliance with the 
original scheme (see section 5.1 in [5]). The detail procedure is 
described as the follows: 
(1)  USIM checks the integrity and validation of TMP. Then 
TPM verifies the integrity of DRM Agent. 
(2)  DRM checks the identity of consumer is valid via USIM 
and TPM. The digital signature could be utilized as a 
specific method. 
(3)  Consumer selects content from website he wants to 
purchase and then will be identified by CI before he 
download the DCF. A lightweight unidirectional 
authentication scheme should be designed here as specific 
method to resist QoS attack. 
(4)  If the consumer is authenticated, the protected DCF 
accompanied with ROAP trigger is sent to DRM Agent. 
Where  S1 encrypted with DRM Agent’s public key is 
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Figure 3. Authentication in TMP-based DRM system 
Figure 4. Compatibility and interoperability between TCG and OMA DRM 
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which S2 encrypted by RI’s public key is embedded. 
(5)  On receipt of ROAP trigger, DRM Agent launches the 
registration phase in accordance with OMA DRM v2. The 
mutual authentication between DRM Agent and RI should 
be enforced during this phase with the help of online 
certificate state protocol (OCSP). 
(6)  If the received registration response is valid DRM Agent 
initiates the RO acquisition phase and transfers its integrity 
metrics to RI via Integrity Report Protocol (refer to section 
5.5 in [14] for detail). Before responding the RO to DRM 
Agent, RI should turn to trusted authority to verify the 
validity of the integrity metrics via Validation Data Protocol 
(see section 5.4 in [14]) so as to check the current state of 
DRM Agent and TMP is valid. Then S2 encrypted by DRM 
Agent’s public key and embedded in RO is sent to ME. 
(7)  DRM Agent retrieves two key seeds from CDF and RO 
separately and computes CEK=KDF(S1, S2). Where KDF is 
a key derivation function shared between CI and DRM 
Agent. Then DRM Agent can decrypt DCF with the CEK 
and enjoy the downloaded content. 
3  CONCLUSION 
With the steady increase of digital media distribution over 
wireless networks, digital rights management is becoming a 
required system component in the mobile industry. The 
currently issued OMA DRM v2 specifications are expected to 
provide a controlled consumption of digital content to protect 
the intellectual property rights in mobile networks. However, 
they have been facing the following potential risks according to 
our analysis in this paper: 
(1)  Current mobile platforms including its software and 
hardware are unsecure.  
(2)  OMA DRM systems don’t provide a way to protect digital 
content from the RI.  
(3)  The uncontrolled download may result in possible DoS 
attack on CI and wireless network operator. 
The concepts and features of OMA DRM associated with TC 
are presented in this paper to provide a new way for mobile 
DRM system. How to offer interoperability and compatibility 
between TC and OMA DRM are also discussed so as to support 
more feasibility of mobile DRM in real market. Then a TMP-
based DRM scheme is proposed for mobile networks to solve 
the existing security flaws in current OMA DRM system. Since 
some key features of TC are beneficial to satisfy critical 
requirements of DRM system, we argue that the TMP in 
conjunction with OMA DRM may offer a considerably more 
robust DRM system for future mobile networks. 
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Figure 5. Basic download pull model in our proposed TMP-based DRM system 
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